The Dynamics of Escalating Violence in Relationships: A Non-Cooperative Game Theory Approach

• In Event: Crime Prevention and the Psychology of Risk and Action

Abstract

This study examines the escalation of intimate partner violence to homicide through the application of non-cooperative game theory. Existing models, such as Johnson’s typology, Walker’s cycle of violence, Monckton-Smith’s eight-stage timeline, and Luckenbill’s concept of situated transactions, describe patterns of intimate partner violence but do not fully account for the repeated, strategic nature of conflict. This framework addresses that gap by identifying three key elements of escalation- asymmetric power and information, sequential and repeated interactions, and bounded rationality- which explain how cycles of power, control, and retaliation develop over time. Because roles in violent relationships are often fluid, escalating partners adjust coercive tactics based on prior interactions, exploiting information asymmetries and reinforcing dominance through calculated acts of control. Meanwhile, responding partners engage in compliance, resistance, or retaliation, shaping the trajectory of escalation. The cases of Ali and Ana Abulaban and Amber and Joshua Hilberling illustrate how these elements manifest in both unidirectional and bidirectional violence, reinforcing the path-dependent nature of escalation. Findings highlight how past interactions shape future violence, making lethal outcomes more predictable. This research offers a new theoretical framework that underscores the necessity of dynamic intervention strategies, including unpredictable safety planning and improved risk assessment tools.

Authors

• Courtney Marie Dowdall, Simon Fraser University

• Alexandra Lysova, Simon Fraser University