Power, pressure, and plea deals: Investigating coercion in plea negotiations

• In Event: The Process and Consequences of Guilty Pleas

Abstract

This research sought to empirically test Luna’s (2022) theoretical definition of coercion. According to this definition, coercion consists of four key elements: 1) power, 2) constraints (e.g., overcharging), 3) conditional offers (e.g., exceedingly large plea discounts), and 4) conditional threats (e.g., seeking sentence enhancements at trial). Although several plea negotiation tactics have been identified as potentially coercive in academic literature (e.g., see Dervan, 2012), little empirical research has tested coercion in this context. To address this gap, 448 participants acting as defendants engaged in a simulated online plea negotiation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 32 conditions in a 2 (Power: high vs. low) × 2 (Constraint: present vs. absent) × 2 (Conditional offer: present vs. absent) × 2 (Conditional threat: present vs. absent) × 2 (Guilt: guilty vs. innocent) between-subjects factorial design, creating both coercive and non-coercive conditions. Key outcomes measured include plea deal acceptance, perceived coercion, evidence strength, and probability of conviction. Findings from this research will be presented and will help to enhance understanding of coercion in plea negotiations.

Authors

• Samantha Luna, University of Houston-Clear Lake

• Sabrina Garcia, University of Houston-Clear Lake

• Sahir Damani, University of Houston-Clear Lake