Investigative Autonomy or Prosecutorial Control? The Struggle for Direction in Chile’s Criminal Investigations. A Principal-Agent Dilemma.

• In Event: Prosecution in the Making III: Prosecutors as Court Actors

Abstract

This study examines the dynamics of prosecutorial investigative direction in Chile, focusing on the delegation of investigative tasks to police under the so-called functional direction model. While Chile’s 2000 criminal procedure reform granted prosecutors legal authority to direct investigations, this study finds that prosecutorial control varies significantly across different case types, shaped by information asymmetry, institutional constraints, and agency slack. Using qualitative interviews with prosecutors and police officers (n=34) and documentary analysis of case files (n=82), this research explores how prosecutors navigate their directive role in flagrancy cases, mass case processing, and complex investigations. Applying principal-agent theory, the findings reveal persistent monitoring challenges, incentive misalignments, and informal adaptations that shape the prosecutor-police relationship. The study argues that while the formal framework suggests a hierarchical model of control, practical realities create a more complex negotiation process, where prosecutors often exert greater influence through collaboration than rigid oversight.

Author

• Victor Beltran, Universidad Diego Portales