Rise In Juveniles Tried as Adults Through Transfers: The Use of Fear-Based Rhetoric Over Neuroscience Research

• In Event: Legal and Theoretical Perspectives on the Role of Biological and Psychological Factors in Crime and Criminal Justice

Abstract

Since the 1970s' rise in incarceration, juvenile justice has followed suit. While In Re Gault (1967) granted juveniles constitutional rights, it was also a reaction to fears of social disorder. The 1990s' "superpredator" myth fueled punitive policies, including Stanford v. Kentucky (1989), which upheld the juvenile death penalty, despite declining youth crime. SCOTUS later ruled against such extreme sentences—Roper v. Simmons (2005) banned juvenile executions, followed by Graham (2010), Miller (2012), and Montgomery (2016) restricting life without parole. Yet, states increasingly circumvent these rulings by transferring more juveniles to adult courts, including children under 12.
This study develops a Python-based model estimating juvenile transfers and racial disparities, integrating Supreme Court rulings, waiver records, and federal data (UCR, EZAJCS). Additionally, a sentiment analysis of legal texts demonstrates how fear-based rhetoric overwhelms, or even ignores, neuroscience arguments of cognitive development and potential for rehabilitation, culminating in shaping criminal legal policy. Training a model on historical cases (In Re Gault, Leopold and Loeb, Cicero’s In Catilinam), this study examines how legal language constructs juvenile culpability. Findings will reveal whether punitive policies persist despite neuroscience-backed protections.

Author

• Amanda L. Sutton, Georgia State University