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Prosecutors play a critical role in shaping criminal justice outcomes, yet cross-national empirical research on prosecution remains limited. The paper addresses this gap by analyzing prosecutorial discretion and decision-making in Bangladesh, Colombia, Ghana, and the United States—four countries that reflect divergent legal heritages, political systems, and institutional arrangements. We explore how prosecutors in each country navigate key functions of filing charges, dismissing cases, requesting pretrial detention, negotiating plea agreements, recommending sentences, and engaging in investigations. Drawing on mixed methods analyses of statutes, operational guidelines and administrative data, we investigate how prosecutorial function and decision-making are shaped by institutional designs, legal tradition, and oversight mechanisms. In doing so, we provide new insights into the differences and similarities among the post-colonial common law tradition in Bangladesh, Ghana, Colombia’s relatively young adversarial system, and the U.S. model of decentralized prosecutorial function. Our analyses showed key differences among these jurisdictions, including the elected versus appointed positions of chief prosecutors, the exercise of discretion over case filing and dismissal, the magnitude of plea bargaining and dispositions, and the investigative function of the prosecutorial offices. We conclude by identifying the strengths, limitations, and opportunities for reform aimed at enhancing prosecutorial functionality and fairness.