Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Area
Browse By Session Type
Search Tips
ASC Home
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Police officers in the United States are frequently the subject of civilian complaints, yet relatively few of these complaints result in formal discipline. A growing body of work critiques this lack of accountability, but far less is known about whether disciplinary actions, when they do occur, meaningfully alter officer behavior. This project investigates the causal effects of officer discipline on subsequent behavior, including uses of force, stops, arrests, citations, and future complaints.
To do so, I develop a within-officer, peer-relative difference-in-differences design that compares each officer’s behavior before and after a sustained complaint, relative to peers working the same beat, day, shift, and month-year. This approach accounts for changing assignments and controls for shared contextual factors that affect policing exposure. I extend the framework to test for behavioral changes after unsustained complaints and officer-involved shootings, allowing comparison across high-salience but different forms of intervention.
The empirical strategy produces officer-level treatment effects that can be aggregated to estimate department-wide impacts. Results provide insight into whether current disciplinary mechanisms deter harmful behavior, or merely mark it, and offer guidance for departments seeking to improve accountability through policy. This framework is broadly applicable to any discrete intervention affecting officer conduct.