Poster #78 - Household Bargaining and Desistance from Crime

• In Event: Poster Session I (posters 1 - 79)

Abstract

Family formation is associated with sharp declines in men’s criminal activity, but the underlying mechanisms remain underexplored. This paper proposes and tests an intrahousehold bargaining mechanism of desistance. Entering a union, whether through cohabitation or marriage, brings otherwise unconstrained risky behaviors under joint decision-making. Partner disapproval creates demand for change, while bargaining power provides leverage to enforce it. Using individual-level panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) linked to gender-specific local labor demand shocks, I show that improvements in women’s relative labor market opportunities, used as a proxy for bargaining power, reduce their male partners’ likelihood of arrest. The largest declines occur among high-risk men paired with high-leverage female partners. The effects are at least as strong for cohabitation as for marriage, consistent with a bargaining-based mechanism of desistance rather than explanations based solely on selection into unions or identity change.

Author

• Ji Hye Choi, Rutgers University