Search
Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Room
Browse By Category
Browse By Session Type
Browse By Affiliate Organization
Search Tips
About the 2014 Convention
About San Antonio
2014 Program Theme
About ASEEES
Personal Schedule
Sign In
This paper (a work in progress) is part of a larger project where I investigate changing Soviet expropriation patterns over time. Following the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917, all private property in Russian industry was expropriated without compensation to its previous owners. The Soviet government treated domestic and foreign owners alike, imposing significant costs on the expropriated parties. Following the Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1939, these patterns were slightly altered. In contrast to 1917, the Soviet government negotiated with foreign creditors, agreeing to issue compensation. Using a detailed data set for Swedish assets expropriated by Soviet authorities, I examine the differences between the two expropriation events. It is argued, that the difference can be explained with reference to external security considerations. The conclusion is congruent with Paul Gregory’s argument, that Stalin, in contrast to Lenin, was a stationary bandit.