The Electoral Calculations and Reputation Costs Trade-Off: Renomination and Electoral Performance of Former Autocratic Elites in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine

• In Event: Repression from above and Legitimacy to below: Subnational Elites and Authoritarian Politics in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia

Abstract

Although the literature on authoritarian successor parties is substantial, the number of studies investigating the fate of former members of authoritarian ruling parties following a regime breakdown is limited. While inviting former autocratic elites incurs reputation costs for new regimes, parties are compelled to recruit them to maximize their vote counts in future elections. In this study, I examine this phenomenon by analyzing the renomination and electoral performance of former authoritarian ruling party members in the aftermath of the Ukrainian Euromaidan Revolution. The empirical analysis reveals that new parties seek to recruit former autocratic elites by minimizing reputation costs and maximizing electoral benefits. Additionally, these nomination patterns are more pronounced in the recruitment of a new ruling party than in that of an authoritarian successor party. These findings offer critical insights for the literature on democratization, authoritarian (successor) parties, and post-Euromaidan politics in Ukraine.

Author

• Masatomo Torikai, Osaka U (Japan)