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For any dictator, elite purges are an instrument of power control. The elimination of the Red Army high command in Stalin’s Great Terror in 1937-38, one of the bloodiest episodes of elite repression in history, is a prime example of elite purges in authoritarian regimes. Using open and archival sources, we confirm that the Stalin’s purge was preemptive: the risk to be purged was higher for certain ethnic minorities, higher military ranks, and those with prior foreign contacts, but not for those who were network-connected to the purged leaders. The purges targeted most competent officers: controlling for other characteristics, the risk was much higher for younger cadres. As war-time promotions in 1941-1942 were inversely related to age, this is the first systematic evidence that the Great Terror directly impacted the disastrous Red Army performance early in WWII, and a confirmation that purges bring a significant efficiency loss for authoritarian regimes.