The Technocrats: Bureaucratic Control and Governance in Russia

• In Event: The Politics of Russia’s War Machine

Abstract

Authoritarian regimes, and in particular Russia, rely on competent officials to maintain governance and economic stability. For example as of 2024, one in six top Russian officials had either studied at a Western university or worked for a multinational corporation. Conventional theories suggest dictators distrust competent officials, preferring weak, loyal subordinates to avoid being overthrown—seen in Mao’s “coalitions of the weak” and Haile Selassie’s reliance on ineffective ministers. Yet, autocrats strategically recruit and control skilled officials without risking regime stability. How do modern regimes delegate such power to highly qualified individuals without jeopardizing their hold on power? This paper argues that dictators have mastered a set of strategies designed to monitor the behavior and ambitions of the most capable, harnessing their talents towards regime preservation rather than overthrowing the government. What matters most is how autocrats strategically recruit, assign, monitor, reward, and punish officials. First, using new data on technocratic ministers working for 98 autocratic regimes from 1966 to 2021, I uncover clear patterns in how technocrats are assigned to specific bureaucracies and then monitored closely by regime cronies. To further dig into mechanisms, I then exploit data on Putin-era Russia to demonstrate how rotations, political commissars and anti-corruption investigations keep technocrats in check without sacrificing the expertise they contribute to governance. In doing so, I challenge a key body of theoretical work on dictatorships which argues autocrats are reluctant to delegate real power to competent viziers – e.g those with the most impressive educational and economic backgrounds.

Author

• David Szakonyi, George Washington U