Search
In-Person Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Category
Browse By Session Type
Browse By Affiliate Organization
Browse by Featured Sessions
Browse Spotlight on Central Asian Studies
Drop-in Help Desk
Search Tips
Sponsors
About ASEEES
Code of Conduct Policy
Personal Schedule
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
This paper examines the People's Republic of China's (PRC) efforts to convert coal to oil in the 1950s. Facing a critical oil shortage after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Beijing communist government sought to leverage German technology to utilize China's abundant coal reserves. Chinese engineers and trade officials made frequent trips to East German factories and East Berlin to negotiate a bilateral agreement for this coal-to-oil project. However, technical challenges and bureaucratic economic calculations impeded cooperation for an extended period. To strengthen its negotiating position with East Germany, Beijing even explored partnerships with other socialist nations. This paper argues that the proclaimed socialist solidarity between Beijing and East Berlin proved hollow in the face of a project promising significant mutual benefits. Notably, engineers and mid-level trade officials, rather than high-ranking communist bureaucrats, played a pivotal role in the negotiations.