Search
In-Person Program Calendar
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Category
Browse By Session Type
Browse By Affiliate Organization
Browse by Featured Sessions
Browse Spotlight on Central Asian Studies
Drop-in Help Desk
Search Tips
Sponsors
About ASEEES
Code of Conduct Policy
Personal Schedule
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
This paper examines the political economy of the production of illiberal bills in the Russian State Duma. Since 2011 MPs have passed a staggering number of illiberal bills in various policy areas from education to constitutional arrangements at an astonishing speed that undermine the spirit of the Russian Constitution. This development has been striking but our understanding of it remains vague. Using a mixed methods approach of quantitative and qualitative analyses, I establish that legislator-sponsored bills form parts of a rent-seeking strategy that leads to career advancement and other spoils. The findings have implications for the understanding of the Russian State Duma as a complex ecosystem of contesting interests and how illiberalism works in practice.