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With Arab opinion solidified against the Camp David Accords between Egypt, Israel, and the United States in late 1978, the Soviet Union appeared to be on the cusp of reentering the region as a major player. But shortly thereafter, it became clear that Moscow had no control over its partners in the Middle East, a point driven home by the war between the Yemens in February–March 1979. Drawing on a range of sources in Russian, Bulgarian, and Arabic, this paper will explore Soviet-Arab relations in the year leading up to the invasion of Afghanistan, and will argue that Soviet policy toward the Middle East was essentially reactive and that the invasion of Afghanistan was, in part, due to anxieties about having been pushed out of the Middle East.