Constitutional Courts in Post-Soviet States: Divergent Trajectories of Judicial Power

• In Event: The Role of Courts in Eurasia

Abstract

This paper examines the divergent evolutionary paths of constitutional courts in post-Soviet states since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. While these courts were formally established with similar mandates to enforce constitutional principles, their actual strength, independence, and impact on political governance have varied substantially across the region. Through analysis of an original dataset comprising full-text decisions from constitutional courts in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine, this study employs computational topic modeling to identify distinctive patterns in judicial behavior and constitutional development. The findings reveal four primary trajectories: instrumentalization (courts serving as tools of political elites), traditionalization (courts reinforcing historical-cultural legal norms), bureaucratization (courts focusing on administrative and procedural reforms), and internationalization (courts increasingly aligning with global constitutional standards). These trajectories correspond to different functional roles, from facilitating the transition away from socialist legal frameworks to arbitrating high-stakes electoral disputes. The analysis demonstrates how constitutional courts, despite similar institutional origins, have become embedded in distinctly different governance systems, reflecting broader political developments in each state. This research contributes to our understanding of post-authoritarian judicial development and the complex relationship between constitutional courts and regime dynamics in transitional contexts.

Author

• Alisher Juzgenbayev, Northwestern U