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Client power is sometimes referred to as the direct, 'short' route of accountability. In education, this refers to parents choosing private schools for their children and holding them accountable through a credible threat of changing schools should the standards be unsatisfactory. In the Liberian early childhood education (ECE) system, the direct route of accountability also extends to the relationship between government schools (which are all fee paying) and parents. We apply the RISE (2015) framework to the ECE system in Liberia to situate the client power relationship in the context of the wider system and to examine whether elements are aligned towards improving quality as measured by learning outcomes and classroom observations and increasing equity through addressing the issue of overage enrolment. Our paper combines rigorous systems theory with data collected from a sample 490 student assessments, 478 parent interviews (of sampled children), and 50 detailed cost reports from schools principals.
Following the key elements of the RISE framework, we ask:
Do parents set good targets about the age of enrolment and school quality? Is there any evidence that they choose schools based on considerations about quality or the age of enrolment?
Do parents have the financial resources required to enrol their children in better quality schools and/or at a younger age?
Do parents base their school choice decision on information about quality or overage enrolment?
Are parents satisfied with the quality of their schools? Are there mechanisms in place for rewarding or sanctioning schools on the issue of quality or overage enrolment, and are parents aware of them?
We argue that fees are the most binding constraint to accountability in the ECE system in Liberia.