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In countries with weak states and institutions, education reforms face discontinuities beyond those usual in any policy process. Political instability, corruption and general institutional weakness make the formation of broad political settlements almost impossible. In their absence there is little to ensure that the general shape of reforms will continue over time. In such contexts, technocrats, often supported by international donor networks, have come to dominate the policy landscape, defining agendas and carrying them forward. From the perspective of measurements and indicators, their achievements in the Peruvian case seem impressive. But, as we argue, their self-reliance and sometimes insularity, as well as their reluctance to engage more openly in the politics of reform, have weakened their achievements in the longer term and have limited the focus of reforms to a rather narrow understanding of learning. The paper makes these points by focusing on findings from a larger historical case study of the political economy of education reforms in Peru that was part of the RISE programme.