Examining Joint-leadership between central ministry and local government in Chinese vocational education: A Principal Agent perspective

• In Event: Case studies in educational leadership

Proposal

Research Context


In China, the education system has undergone a recent shift in governance, moving from bureaucratic government management to inter-governmental collaboration between central government and lower levels of authority (Tao, 2022). This transition led to a decentralization of power structure and a flatter and interconnected administration system. In this analysis, we focus on a new inter-governmental model in Chinese vocational education, namely, the Joint leadership between Central Ministry and Local Government (JCL) model. This joint-leadership model takes advantages of the resources from both central and local governments and enables channels for collaboration, negotiation, and consultation. In 2022, the JCL model became a stable governance model for the vocational education in China. Yet, there is relatively little in-depth research on the mechanism of joint leadership, especially the lack of discussion on its relationship with the national political and financial systems. In this analysis, we aim to answer two question : (1) How can we understand the foundation and mechanism of this governance model in a unitary state with highly centralized and hierarchical power structure, utilizing the PAT framework? (2) What insights can this mechanism offer to the governance of vocational education in China or worldwide? This study develops an analytical framework based on bidirectional and multiple principal-agent theories, with a focus on Shandong Province, China.

Theoretical Framework

To reveal the operational process and application of the JCL in Chinese vocational education, we applied Principal Agent Theory (PAT) and considered two modifications of this theory. The PAT is originally used to understand the dynamics of formal contractual relationships, but it has been widely applied to understanding inter-governmental administrative systems and, in particular, educational policies and practices in recent decades (e.g., Duff & Wohlstetter, 2019). In this analysis, we argue that the PAT provides a flexible framework to examine the joint-leadership practices of Chinese vocational education administrative system. In particular, the PAT helps understand the basic power structure of the design of the joint-leadership system of vocational education and further unpack the way in which different levels government align their interests with the implementation of the polices.

In this analysis, we further considered two modifications of the traditional PAT framework. First, studies of applying PAT to educational administration often consider public education as chains of delegation where the central government delegate primary tasks to local governments and local governments further form a secondary principal-agent delegation with school districts or administrative entities (Dür & Elsig, 2011). We argue that the power structure of Chinese vocational education follows this basic chain of delegation. Second, studies of PAT also consider multiple contractual relationships within the same policy implementation issue; that is, multiple principals may seek to establish delegation relationships with one agent (Hawkins & Jacoby, 2008), whereas one principal can also delegate with multiple agents (Damro, 2007). In this analysis, we argue that such “multiple to one” type of structure is common in Chinese vocational education system. In particular, the central government establishes contractual relationships with multiple local governments, creating multiple P-A delegations.


Methods


This analysis selected the Shandong province as a case to understand the implementation of the JCL in vocational education. First, we conducted 37 in-depth interviews with both central ministry and local officials, vocational institute administrators, and faculty members. Second, we collected and analyzed policy documents related to the JCL in Shandong province since 2012, including the original document and additional policies introduced by Shandong Province to implement the agreement. These policy documents add up to 47 copies. Third, as the appointed JCL supervision committee member of the Ministry of Education, the researcher have participated in the research and development of the JCL agreement between ministry of education and Shandong province throughout the process as a first-hand observation to directly observe and participate in the observation.


Findings


With a theory-driven coding process, we analyzed several key theoretical categories, including multiple principal-agent relationships, performance, the Matthew effect, and the politics of attention. Three main themes then emerged from these categories.

(1) the Ministry of Education and the provincial government rely on a hierarchical delegation agency chain and project-based governance to implement JCL: the first layer of agency relationship in this chain is one-multiple agency relationship between ministry of education and provincial; the second layer of agency relationship in this chain is agency relationship between joint-congress system and provincial administrative departments, the third layer of agency relationship in this chain is agency relationship between provincial administrative departments and vocational school via project subcontracting.

(2) In order to prevent moral hazard and opportunism of the agent, the two parties establish guarantee of cooperation through the following two mechanisms: Developing agreement bridging practical realities and ideal scenarios, and getting politics of attention from the Ministry of Education.


(3) JCL has exacerbated the “Matthew Effect” in both inter-province and intra-province development: , Matthew effect in inter-province comes from acquisition of differentiated resources. By engaging in JCL, Shandong Province has gained access to unique resources from the Ministry of Education. These extra opportunities exacerbate the gap in the development of vocational education between Shandong Province and other regions. Matthew effect in intra-province comes from differentiated investment of provincial resources under performance orientation. In order to achieve significant progress in key reform initiatives, the provincial government has allocated major tasks to economically advantaged cities and exceptional schools. Consequently, high-quality resources, including special funds, projects, preferential policies, and reform privileges, are concentrated in these regions and schools.


Contribution

The contributions of this study: (1) Using intergovernmental relations as an important perspective to observe the differences in governance models of vocational education in different countries, and providing a theory driven case analysis; (2) We have rationalized the policy concept of JCL and conducted a deep analysis of its importance in the governance of vocational education in China, its impact on the organizational behavior of vocational colleges, as well as its connection with global vocational education governance reforms.

Authors

• ZHENG LI, East China Normal University

• Shangmou Xu, University of Washington