Accountability and Governance in Education: A Critical Analysis of PPP Models in Sindh, Pakistan

• In Event: School choice and the global world order

Proposal

The main argument behind the failure to ensure quality learning appears to be low funding, poor governance, and ineffective accountability mechanisms (Archer & Muntasim, 2020; Barrera Osorio, 2009). Focusing on outcomes, contemporary education reforms have been reshaped, and a focus on accountability and a new approach to governance has been added (Ball & Junemann, 2012). Public-private partnerships (PPPs) in education are promoted as a new governance model in education, along with an accountability mechanism, and it is also considered a joint effort of both public and private forces to improve education (Patrinos et al., 2009; Verger, 2012).
. The Sindh province of Pakistan has also adopted the PPP policies in education and has been consistently expanding its network by contracting additional private providers to operate PPP schools in the form of Foundation Assisted schools (FAS) and Education Management Organizations (EMOs] (School Education Department Sindh [SELD], 2017; Rind, 2022).
Educational governance through PPPs is complex, involving multiple actors and partnerships, and effectiveness is also limited and fragmented (Faul et al., 2024). Further, accountability is a shared process that may not be limited to a single actor, such as teachers. In light of the paradoxes surrounding PPP models, this paper seeks to critically examine the governance and accountability mechanisms of PPP schools in Pakistan. Specifically, it investigates “To what extent to new governance structures and decentralization efforts—implemented through PPPs in Sindh—been effective? Furthermore, it explores how accountability mechanisms, such as reward and sanction systems, influence key stakeholders, particularly teachers, in contributing to improved learning outcomes.
This study is grounded in the theoretical frameworks of accountability in schools as discussed by Lingard et al. (2017) and performativity, conceptualized by Ball (2003). These frameworks highlight a paradigm shift in accountability policy, particularly within the context of New Public Management (NPM). Ball (2003) defines performativity as “a technology, a culture and a mode of regulation that employs judgements, comparisons and displays as means of incentive, control, attrition and change based on rewards and sanctions (both material and symbolic)” (p. 1).
This model of accountability exerts a significant influence on the professional autonomy of educators. Teachers are frequently blamed for systemic shortcomings, as accountability becomes a top-down and overly simplistic mechanism (Lingard et al., 2017).
In response to ineffective bureaucratic accountability in Pakistan, the PPP models have introduced a new accountability paradigm, where school funding is linked to students’ test scores and performance on key indicators (Verger et al., 2020). Within this framework, parental agency is enhanced through "school choice," and the state assumes a regulatory role by outsourcing education services to private actors via contractual agreements and competitive bidding (Rind, 2022).

This study adopts an interpretive research approach, employing qualitative methods that include document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and focus group discussions (FGDs). Document analysis has focused on publicly available materials such as official records, PPP contracts, terms of reference, and relevant policy documents to understand the structural and regulatory dimensions of PPP models. Semi-structured interviews and FGDs have been conducted with key stakeholders to elicit their critical perspectives and lived experiences related to PPP implementation, accountability mechanisms, and their implications for public education in Sindh.
Participants were selected using purposive and heterogeneous sampling strategies to capture diverse perspectives from individuals directly involved with or experienced in the two major PPP models in education operating in Sindh, Pakistan. The sample included PPP policy developers (comprising donors and government officials), PPP school operators and managers, as well as teachers from both PPP and government schools. Following the collection of data through document reviews, interviews, and FGDs, the interviews were transcribed verbatim and translated where necessary, and subsequently organized into broader themes that aligned with recurring patterns related to PPPs, school accountability, decentralization, monitoring, and evaluation (Braun & Clarke, 2022).
The findings of this study explained that the PPP models offer the advantages of decentralization in governance, which helps in reducing the teachers' shortage and the optimum utilization of the funds through school-based management. However, both PPP models (FAS and EMOs) ensure accountability based on school performance, mainly students’ test scores.
The EMO model, with its formal bidding procedures and KPIs, introduces a structured approach to performance-based accountability. Yet even this model suffers from bureaucratic rigidity, over-reliance on non-educator consultants, and poor localization of the funding, particularly in marginalized areas. The FAS model, in contrast, is more decentralized and has an accountability mechanism using the tool of per-child subsidy. Parents have the choice of taking away the children. Also, the government reduces the funding if the students’ scores appear below the threshold. However, it has also vague contractual obligations, a lack of performance incentives, and a uniform per-child subsidy that fails to accommodate geographic and socioeconomic disparities. While it has succeeded in expanding access to education in underserved regions, this expansion often comes at the cost of educational quality, teacher capacity, and long-term sustainability. The PPP models in Sindh, Pakistan, hire low-qualified contractual teachers at a very low salary, which has raised concerns about teachers’ professionalism, quality, and retention.
Moreover, the school choice and parental autonomy approach also lacks robustness in the PPP model. In the Pakistani context, parental decisions are more closely aligned with proximity, affordability, and gendered expectations than with informed assessments of school quality. Information asymmetries limited civic literacy, and weak community integration into governance structures further restricts the role of parents as effective agents of accountability.
In conclusion, PPPs in Sindh represent a market-based reform model in education that has yielded mixed outcomes in governance and accountability. While they offer important insights into alternative governance models, their current structure somewhat yields better performance in accountability at the local level and governance, such as teachers’ hiring and parental involvement. Further, recalibration of PPP design—one that embeds contextual dynamics, participatory governance, and professional integrity—is essential to realize the promise of inclusive and quality education for all.

Authors

• Gul Muhammad Rind, Univeristy of Autonomous Barcelona VAT/NIF: ESQ0818002H

• Abdul Ghani Soomro, Sukkur IBA University Sindh Pakistan