Education and refugee futures in the post-Assad era: A comparative case study return aspirations across Lebanon, Jordan, and Türkiye

• In Event: Refugee trajectories, mobility, aspirations, and political constraints

Proposal

The nearly 14-year conflict in Syria has led to one of the worst humanitarian crises in modern history including the displacement of 6.2 million refugees. The fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ended over 50 years of family rule and inspired a critical moment of hope and opening for peace and stability. Since then, an estimated 472,963 Syrians have crossed back to Syria via neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2025). The new Syrian transitional government is calling for the return of refugees and human capital and experience. While most Syrians hope to return, many have adopted a “wait and see” approach as conflict continues to flair across Syria, with limited guarantees for returnees’ rights, security, and stability. The civil war devastated Syria’s infrastructure, economy, and basic facilities, including the education system. While education is widely acknowledged as a critical factor shaping refugee lives, there is a striking lack of evidence on how education opportunities influence return aspirations.

We address this gap through a multi-county comparative case study focused on the education-related push and pull factors in the post-Assad era, asking: How do education opportunities in Syria and in host countries– Lebanon, Jordan and Türkiye– interact with broader political, social and economic realities to shape Syrian refugee aspirations for return? Understanding how education shapes Syrian refugee’s decisions to return or remain in their host countries has implications for addressing regional education needs, supporting informed and voluntary return, and contributing to education continuity both for those that choose voluntary return and those that choose to remain in their host countries.

Existing scholarship on refugees’ aspiration for return identifies an extensive list of micro, meso, and macro-level factors including conditions in the country of origin, transnational ties, identity-driven motivations, and preparedness for return among other factors (Kayaoglu et al., 2021). To systematically examine the range of possible factors, Koser and Kuchminder (2015) group these factors in five categories: Conditions in the origin country, conditions in the receiving country, individual factors (e.g. age, gender, time abroad), social factors (e.g. family/social circumstances), and policy related factors (e.g. policies that either directly or indirectly provide incentives/disincentives). This study builds on this framework by interrogating how education interacts with these categories to function both as a push and pull factor in Syrian refugees’ migration decision-making and aspirations of return.

This study employs a multi-country comparative case study approach (Bartlett & Vavrus, 2016), exploring commonalities and divergencies across a horizontal axis of three major refugee-hosting contexts, Lebanon, Türkiye and Jordan. We draw on semi-structured interviews with actors engaged in the Syria education response at the global, national and school levels including those from multilateral, bilateral, and UN agencies as well as international and local NGOs (n=33). We also draw on a thorough analysis of secondary data including academic literature related to the Syria crisis and refugee return, UN situation reports, refugee intention surveys, and other grey literature. A key limitation of this study is that we were unable to include Syrian families or learners in our sample. Findings related to factors that influence Syrian families’ decision-making draw on data collected through surveys, assessments, and academic studies and semi-structured interviews with educationalists that work closely with Syrian refugee communities.

Our study finds that education is an important but secondary driver of return decision-making, after concerns related to household economics and security. Syrian families with school-aged children who are considering return weigh relative access to education in host countries and in Syria among other complex considerations. Yet, three education-related factors emerged as crucial factors in these decision-making processes. First, education access in refugee-hosting nations; while refugee hosting-government have not officially shifted policy positions with regards to the education of Syrian refugee children, there is broad consensus that education opportunities could be hindered by recent cuts in international financing whereby host governments, highly dependent on aid, further deprioritise education services for non-citizens. In this way, there is a serious risk that reductions in education services could represent a push factor and risk refugees’ right to make informed and voluntary decisions about return while leaving children at risk of disrupted learning or drop out.

Second, learners’ sense of belonging and identities, as a result of experiences of inclusion and exclusion across Lebanon, Jordan, and Türkiye, weigh in migration decisions. Syrian students in all three countries face bullying, xenophobia, and other forms of discrimination in schools—which contributes to drop-out and limits their ability to envision their futures in their host countries. This is further nuanced by the extent to which Syrian learners feel connected to Syria and feel at home in their host communities, also informing migration decision-making.

Finally, families feel concern about the educational context in Syria, school readiness, and the procedures that will impact their children’s successful integration into the Syrian education system at an appropriate level. Challenges include curriculum and language of instruction differences, as well as gaps in learning due to limited education access and quality. Refugees across the region are also concerned about securing the required documentation to enrol in Syrian schools, especially uncertain for out of school learners and those in non-formal education programmes. Finally, inadequate up-to-date, trusted, and robust information limits the ability of families to make informed decisions about return in ways that support education continuity. Taken together, these issues reveal that education opportunities are important in shaping refugee aspirations, operating alongside security and economic conditions to influence the complex calculus of return.

The fall of the Assad regime represents both a moment of hope and a profound test for the Syrian transitional government and international cooperation. Ensuring education continuity for all Syrians is foundational to peacebuilding, restoration of stability, and increased human capital and economic growth. However, poorly managed or underfunded education policies risk exacerbating inequality, reinforcing divisions, and compelling premature or involuntary returns. As Syria enters a new and fragile phase of political transition, ensuring education continuity—whether in host countries, inside Syria, or through resettlement—is foundational to peacebuilding and upholding the right to education.

Authors

• Arianna Pacifico, International Rescue Committee

• Hiba Salem