Probation Violations and Process-Based Punishment: How Front-End Inefficiencies Contribute to Back-End Punishments

• In Event: Punishment and rehabilitation: balancing competing goals?

Abstract

Typically comprised of prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and probation staff, the courthouse workgroup administers criminal courts in the U.S., where judicial processes are often termed punishments in and of themselves (Feeley, 1979). The degree to which these processes serve as punishments is theorized to depend upon how many an individual experiences—how much “law” they are subject to (Black, 1976). However, little research has examined how some individuals experience more or less law in judicial processes due to courthouse workgroup operations. Drawing upon data from 72 interviews and focus groups with 94 staff in a statewide U.S. probation agency, we examine probation staff’s role in the courthouse workgroup and how this relates to the process of punishment. We find lack of cohesion among the courthouse workgroup, which precludes probation from having a substantive voice—particularly when supervision conditions are set through plea negotiations during “front end” depositional processes. To be heard, probation staff issue violations to bring clients back to court for noncompliance, when the courthouse workgroup will be more amenable to their input. Relying on these “back end” violation processes, probation is able to modify conditions they were unable to offer or alter at the front end. Thus, front-end inefficiencies may subject clients to more law on the back end, increasing the degree to which the processes of punishment serve as punishments themselves.

Authors

• Benjamin Mackey, George Mason University

• Loveline Phillips, George Mason University

• Lamont Pyykkonen, George Mason University

• JoAnn Lee, University at Buffalo

• CJ Appleton, George Mason University

• Faye S Taxman, George Mason University