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After decades of seemingly growing interdependence and greater global integration, a process often referred to as globalization, observers now point to increasing signs of ‘deglobalization’ or ‘a movement towards a less connected world, characterized by powerful nation states, local solutions, and border controls rather than global institutions, treaties, and free movement’ (Kornprobst and Wallace, 2021). Developments cited in support of this trend include declines in foreign direct investment, the rise of Trumpism, Brexit and authoritarian governments, and the tech protectionism and other developments associated with the US-China trade war.
In criminology, processes of deglobalization have not been the focus of systematic attention, or at best have been examined tangentially in debates where the focus is predominantly on globalization. Against this background this paper poses two sets of questions. First of all, how did the backlash against globalization take place? What is the role of crime and security within this? If, as some scholars contend, issues around crime and insecurity are in fact constitutive of authoritarian populism and its focus on ‘dangerous Others’, what does this mean for Criminology? Secondly, how should we assess the various trends against globalization? What do deglobalizing dynamics do to the liberal international order? If, as several scholars contend, the criminal law remains central to transnational governance (Palmer, 2021), then does its weakening inevitably result in a greater differentiation of justice systems? Will a weakening of hard and soft law instruments inducing policymakers to adopt tougher penal responses to transnational criminality give rise to greater penal moderation? Or will the unpicking, or ‘insidious twisting’ (Neuman, 2020) of international human rights instruments lead to harsher criminal justice systems?