Criminal Incompetence: Why Criminal Organizations and Markets Work so Poorly

Session Submission Type: Pre-arranged Panel

Abstract

A number of scholars have made similar observations, in discussions of their reading of raw materials on criminal conversations: senior members of criminal organizations don’t seem very good at their job. They are poorly educated and lack curiosity. They are also poorly informed even about their own environments and sometimes even about their own organizations. Their decision making is impulsive rather than strategic. They are far from the masterminds of popular legend, as so often reported both in novels and the press. Yet they often make large sums of money and stay out of prison for long periods of time.

If the hypothesis of a high level of incompetence is correct, then we should be able to offer some explanation. What kinds of individuals choose to enter occupations characterized by high levels of risk, both physical and liberty, given the opportunities available in highly developed countries for capable individuals? What is the selection mechanism that leads individuals to rise up in these organizations? This would not involve quantitative hypothesis testing but perhaps a small number of case studies of how successful illegal entrepreneurs/managers began their careers (backgrounds, choices made) and what seemed to be the significant factors in their success.

Why does offender competence matter? It may explain the patently inefficient configurations that illegal markets sometimes devolve into. Our theories about how markets and organizational forms should respond to policy interventions may be misleading because of an assumption of competence. There may be social benefits from incompetence; illegal products are more expensive than they would otherwise be both because of poor selection of organizational forms and vulnerability to enforcement.

Subtopic

• Topic 1: Perspectives on Crime and Criminal Behavior / Rational Choice Perspectives

Chairs

• Zora Lea Hauser, University of Oxford

• Peter Reuter, University of Maryland

Individual Presentations

• The Implications of Criminal Incompetence for the Behavior of Illegal Drug Markets - Peter Reuter, University of Maryland

• Organised Chaos: Criminal Incompetence in Drug Markets - Zora Lea Hauser, University of Oxford

• Deception, misunderstanding, and incapacity. Why organized crime cooperation fails and offenders get arrested - Edward Kleemans, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam