Free Will and Psychopathy- A Neurophilosophical Approach with implications to Moral and Legal Responsibility

• In Event: New topics in psychopathy

Abstract

Background. The debate between free will (FW) and determinism has long been central to philosophy and theology. Free will implies the ability to make choices undetermined by past events, while determinism suggests all events are caused by prior occurrences. This debate is particularly relevant when considering psychopathy and criminal and moral responsibility. Psychopathy is a complex psychiatric disorder characterized by emotional and cognitive abnormalities, including lack of empathy, shame and remorse. Additionally, impulsivity is a core feature of psychopathy. Research aims. This essay explores the philosophical concepts - free will/determinism in the context of psychopathology, through the lens of philosophy, behavioral psychology and neuroscience. Main arguments. I shall argue that despite the apparent “deterministic” nature of neural processes and neurological deficiencies, psychopaths have some degree of free will. I further contend that neuroscience does not undermine free will and that psychopaths can be considered morally responsible under specific conditions and contexts. Implications for legal and moral responsibility are discussed. Conclusions. Further considerations might include the role of rationality in decision-making, varying degrees of psychopathy (primary vs secondary), implications for rehabilitation as well as broader societal impacts of these views.

Author

• Yula Milshteyn, Ariel University