About the hidden norms behind deterrence communication: crafting effective punishment messages

• In Event: Crime, Science and Politics WG Panel 2 : Innovation and Access in Justice Systems

Abstract

Punishment serves as a crucial mechanism in influencing behavior, yet its effects are not always straightforward. While deterrence theory posits that the certainty of punishment discourages offending behavior, communication about punishment may also activate social norms in ways that counteract deterrence. Specifically, when messages highlight the frequency of individuals being caught and punished, they may inadvertently signal that rule-breaking is common, thereby normalizing and encouraging further violations. This study examines the dual effects of deterrence messaging: enhancing perceptions of punishment certainty while simultaneously reinforcing descriptive social norms of offending behavior. Although prior research has explored deterrence and social norms, there is a gap in understanding how these mechanisms interact when punishment messages are communicated. This research seeks to answer through an experimental design two key questions: (1) Do deterrent messages about the certainty of punishment also increase perceptions that rule-breaking is prevalent and normal? (2) If so, does this undermine the deterrent effect of such messages? By integrating criminological and psychological perspectives, this paper aims to assess the unintended consequences of deterrence communication and provide insights into how punishment messaging can be optimized to minimize adverse effects. Understanding these dynamics is essential for developing law enforcement communication strategies that effectively reduce norm-violating behavior without unintentionally promoting it.

Authors

• Benjamin van Rooij, University of Amsterdam

• Ana Belén Gómez-Bellvís, CRÍMINA Research Centre, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche

• Christopher P. Reinders Folmer, University of Amsterdam