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This paper examines the pervasive issue of corrupt political parties fuelled by illicit trade financing, particularly within the vulnerable context of Southeast Europe. Economically, this practice distorts markets, enabling criminal influence over policy and fostering corruption. The inflow of illicit funds deprives states of revenue, hinders fair competition, and exacerbates inequality. Politically, it erodes democratic institutions, leading to state capture and legislative manipulation. The examples of the Montenegrin DPS and Serbian SNS highlight how illicit activities, like cigarette smuggling and drug trafficking, entrench political corruption, undermining electoral integrity and strengthening authoritarianism.
Socially, links between corrupt political parties and illicit trade breeds public distrust, cynicism, and unrest, diverting funds from essential services and deepening societal divisions. Legally, weak frameworks, selective enforcement, and political interference impede prosecution. Geopolitical factors, such as EU accession and sanctions, further complicate these dynamics.
The core of the issue is the fusion of illicit trade and party financing, where political parties become beholden to criminal actors. This paper argues for a comprehensive approach, drawing from responsive regulation theory, to combat this phenomenon. It advocates for diverse sanctions, ranging from soft regulatory measures to criminal prosecution of individuals and parties. Strengthening political transparency, social accountability, and legal reforms is crucial to disrupting the cycle of illicit financing and restoring public trust.