The Force of the Better Evidence in Political Belief Updating

• In Event: Information Processing and Motivated Reasoning

Abstract

There are long-standing skepticisms about citizens’ ability to use information. Prior research suggests that citizens tend to mechanically rely on contextual cues and adopt elite positions as their own. And they tend to use a modicum of information they receive to rationalize and strengthen their partisan viewpoints. In this article, I present three experiments that challenge these claims, in favor of a Bayesian model of information processing. The experiments examine whether people take the strength of empirical evidence into consideration when they process information about contentious political issues. Across the experiments, I find that people update their beliefs and attitudes in light of presented arguments. People did not mindlessly accept whatever arguments they encounter, nor did they categorically reject uncongenial arguments. Instead, they accounted for the (un)certainty of evidence as they form their posterior opinions, even when it disconfirms their prior opinions.

Author

• Jin Woo Kim, Dartmouth College