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Tracking Political Ads by "Suspicious" Organizations on Facebook

Sat, May 26, 11:00 to 12:15, Hilton Prague, Floor: L, Berlin

Abstract

In light of Russia’s involvement in the 2016 election campaign, digital campaign ads—including ads on Facebook, Twitter, and Google—have garnered increasing attention from the public. Facebook identified hundreds of ads purchased by organizations linked to the Russian state that focused on divisive social issues such as guns, LGBT rights, immigration, and race (Alex Stamos, Facebook Newsroom, September 6, 2017).
Digital campaigning has exponentially grown in recent years, partly due to its “microtargeting” capacity. Campaigns can directly buy audiences (as opposed to buying a media market or media space) and specify the types of voters they want to reach in terms of their interests, political leanings, and demographics. While a strategic decision on who should be targeted with what message may require sophisticated knowledge and skill, the mechanics of targeting specific types of voters and selectively displaying specific ads to certain voters can be easily accomplished on most digital platforms, including Facebook.
The biggest concern regarding digital campaign advertising is that it operates behind the scenes. Because the ads are designed to be displayed to specific voters only, by nature, it is almost impossible to monitor digital advertising with the public scrutiny normally given to other types of campaign ads.
By tracking 6.7 million ads from 9,519 participants, this study empirically investigates digital ads content, sponsors, and the targets in the 2016 US elections. The paper discusses methodological issues arisen in conducting this empirical research as a case study. The study also suggests the future directions in studying misinformation and disinformation, as well as the implications for policy implementation in combating information and disinformation.

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