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Giving and Time

Thu, June 30, 3:30 to 5:00pm, Campus Ersta, Sal 4

Abstract

Intergenerational transfers are a core feature of the practice of philanthropy. A substantial portion of the resources committed to charitable causes come from gifts at death and gifts that continue to pay out after death. Indeed, the power of the foundation, as we know it today, can be attributed in no small part to the instrument of the charitable trust. (The trust splits ownership among multiple parties and extends the life of an enterprise beyond the mortal existence of its initiating agents.) Yet whether and in what way intergenerational philanthropy can be justified is philosophically controversial. Many have thought, for instance, that a right to make post-mortem demands only makes sense in the context of dubious metaphysical views about the interests of dead persons. Leading contemporary perspectives have seemingly found ways to sidestep this problem. Represented in sophisticated form by Cordelli and Reich (forthcoming), such views argue that intergenerational philanthropy is to be justified according to its consistency with the demands of distributive justice. Societies ought to recognize intergenerational charitable transfers because such transfers facilitate justice in certain important ways, namely in savings between generations. In this paper I argue that the distributivist paradigm ignores an important dimension of the political morality of these practices. Although intergenerational charitable transfers do involve saving resources for future generations, they also restrict the liberty of future generations to dispose of property as they will. Respecting the intentions of the past conflicts with the present generation’s ability to control their common affairs. What is troubling about the dead hand of the past, I contend, is its interference with the future generation’s sovereignty over its common affairs. Moreover, the identification of an independent interest in generational sovereignty sets this view apart from other critical perspectives, such as Simes (1955) and Madoff (2011). The paper concludes that while taking the interest in generational sovereignty seriously does not require the abolition of charitable bequests and trusts, it does tell in favor of tighter regulations than most legal systems currently recognize.

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