The Power of Nonprofit: An Empirical Analysis of the Collaborative Relationship between Nonprofits and Foundations in China

• In Event: Key Stakeholders, Power, and Decision-Making

Abstract

There are different types of interaction between organizations, with each type power is distributed unevenly (Austin, 2000; Austin & Seitanidi, 2012).“If weaker parties are not included or are pressured into agreeing to a solution, then it cannot be celebrated as a success” (Gray et al., 2022, p.4), because it is manipulated or dominated by the powerful actors, and turns out to have low level of the representation, participation, and voice of the powerless actors (Ansell & Gash, 2007; Choi & Robertson, 2013; Gray, 1989; Ran & Qi, 2019). However, less attention is given to explore how the powerless party acquires power and how the relationship evolves from a lower-level interaction into the one with higher and deeper level of interaction.
Therefore, the intention of this paper is to examine NGO’s sources of power in their relationships with foundations. Much research focuses on the financial power that foundations hold over NGOs (Fairfield & Wing, 2008; Gronbjerg et al, 2000). However, drawing upon the concept of political capital and survey data collected from China, this paper challenges that simplistic understanding and posits that NGOs hold diverse capitals. These diverse capitals can be mobilized in ways that allow them to have influence in their relationships with foundations.
Specifically, I adopt the framework developed by Ocasio et al. (2020) who proposed the idea of political capital and identified eight kinds of different capitals as sources of power, including economic, social, cultural, symbolic, reputational, knowledge, organizational, and institutional capital. In terms of the exercise of power, Lukes' (2021) three-dimensional view of power is a good fit in this case to illustrate how power are exercised differently along the collaborative continuum through the observable decision-making power, the less observable non-decision-making power, as well as the unobservable ideological power. Building on that, this paper focuses on the decision-making power and non-decision-making power (i.e., agenda-setting power) in the relationship between nonprofits and foundations, especially from the perspective of the traditionally powerless party---nonprofits. Overall, the research questions are as follows:
To what extent do CEO’s and organization’s political capital collectively influence CEO’s perceptions of their decision-making power and agenda-setting power when interacting with foundations? Furthermore, what’s the interactive effect of CEO’s and organization’s political capital on their power exercise with foundations?
Answering these questions is important because it would offer us a more inclusive and broader understanding of power. Instead of understanding power as a zero-sum game based on control and dependence in a hierarchy, I frame power in a more inclusive and collaborative way, that is, power is the ability to bring about significant outcomes (Giddens, 1984; Goldman, 1972; Lukes, 2021; Parsons, 1967; Russell, 2004; Wrong, 1979). Once we incorporate the idea of achieving power through contributions to desirable goals, it is clear that power is not an absolute or natural property of the dominant party, e.g., funders, but characterized as its inclusive and fluid attribute, that nonelites are also likely to possess power if they improve their ability to achieve excellence (Ocasio et al., 2020).

References

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Author

• Wenpei You, Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy