LASA Americas

The Trump Corollary in Central America: Bukele Deal, Model Diffusion, and Populist Realignment in Honduras and Costa Rica

• In Event: Continuidades y reconfiguraciones geopolíticas en Centroamérica: de la Guerra Fría al trumpismo

Abstract

This paper looks at what happens to Central American politics when Washington treats the region as part of its border enforcement system. I argue that the “Trump Corollary” changes incentives in ways that are easy to miss if we focus only on diplomacy. It pushes enforcement outward through deals that shift detention, policing, and migration control onto partner governments. At the same time, it rewards leaders who can deliver dramatic, highly visible security results, giving them extra legitimacy at home and attention abroad. Those rewards make the “Bukele model” more exportable and more tempting.

I develop the argument through three linked cases. In El Salvador, the Bukele–Trump arrangement shows how incarceration and deportation management can become a tool of political theater, with real consequences for courts, oversight, and rights. In Costa Rica, politicians and security agencies borrow elements of Bukele’s playbook—tough rhetoric, prison expansion, and executive-driven policing—while testing the limits of a stronger constitutional tradition. In Honduras, security populism and U.S. signaling shape what candidates promise, what voters expect, and what new governments prioritize once in office.

The paper uses process tracing of key agreements and policy transfers, plus a structured comparison of campaign messaging and early governing moves, to spell out the costs for rule of law, civic space, and democratic resilience.

Author

• Orlando J Perez, University of North Texas at Dallas