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Are democracies better at social spending than autocracies? The evidence so far is conflicting. The resource curse literature argues that one of the ways that autocrats are able to stay in power in resource rich countries is through spending of rents, which helps to dampen nascent pressures for democratization. On the other hand, the democratization literature, assumes that democracies will do a better job of redistributing income than autocracies do.
Latin America, as a highly unequal region blessed with abundant natural resources, provides fertile ground to examine the different ways regimes distribute rents through social spending. In this paper, I examine the determinants of social spending in Latin America and argue that rents from natural resources constitute an important part of this puzzle.