Analyzing the effects of subnational state capacities on intergovernmental relations. Evidence from Argentina and Mexico

• In Event: Intergovernmental Politics in Latin America: New Research Agendas

Abstract

The analysis of state capacity at the national level has been a most prolific and perdurable area of study in the social sciences (Skocpol y Finegold 1982; Geddes 1994; Besley and Persson 2007; Kurtz, 2013). In fact, state capacity is of paramount importance for democratic governance because for protecting civil, political or social rights effectively, capable institutions are vital (Luna y Toro 2014). Moreover, weak state capacity is strongly associated with political instability, dissatisfaction with democracy, and low levels of socioeconomic development (UNDP 2004). Our study is novel as it studies state capacity at the subnational level in federal systems undergoing democratic consolidation. In particular, we explore the effects of various levels of subnational state capacity on intergovernmental relations in multilevel settings. We develop a framework to analyze how the state capacity of subnational governments affects both the implementation of federal programs and the autonomy of subnational governments vis-à-vis the center. The paper contends that higher levels of state capacity allow subnational governments to collect more own source income, and also to implement intergovernmental policies more effectively. High levels of state capacity, thus, may explain the ability of specific subnational governments to extract larger amounts of resources from the federal government. These hypotheses are tested by analyzing the allocation of conditional and non-conditional transfers to the subnational level and the performance of subnational governments in the implementation of selected federal programs in Mexico and Argentina in the last ten years.

Authors

• Lorena Moscovich, Universidad de San Andrés

• Laura Flamand, El Colegio de México