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To maintain its monopoly on coercive force, the state can eliminate its rivals by violent or peaceful means. The violent route is straightforward, if often unsuccessful: destroy rivals. The peaceful route entails negotiations in which the alternatives are defined by both parties and, in many cases, international norms and domestic constituencies. Of these, in Latin America we know least about kinds of security policies publics find legitimate and why.
Unlike other research into public opinion and security policy in Latin America, we develop a theory of public opinion formation not only based on material factors, but contends social preferences – defined as concern for others’ well-being and desire to uphold ethical norms – and victimization are key to understanding the legitimacy policies
A broad interdisciplinary consensus illustrates the fundamental role social preferences play in undergirding the complex institutions modern democratic states rely upon (e.g., Bowles and Gintis 2011). Because the distribution of such social preferences is heterogeneous and dynamic (e.g., Haidt 2012) understanding them is crucial to identifying the structure of security policy publics will find democratically legitimate. Specifically, we theorize canonical social preferences such as trust, norm enforcement, altruism, and reciprocity shape individuals’ support for different aspects of security policy and negotiated peace.
We test theoretical expectations using a unique survey fielded in Colombia during the 2014 peace negations along with public opinion data from Chile collected during the recent violent protests. Deep-seated social preferences play a crucial role in citizen attitudes towards policies either emphasizing punishment or amnesty/negotiations.