Electoral Power: Measuring Executive Control in Andean Institutions

• In Event: Electoral reforms and changes in party fortune: Explaining instability in Latin American elections

Abstract

Flagrant voter fraud and ballot theft are largely a thing of the past. Electoral democracy is firmly established in Latin America and procedures on voting day are generally regarded as free and fair. Yet some countries are experiencing what scholars alternatively call “competitive authoritarianism,” “autocratization,” “electoral authoritarianism,” or “authoritarian constitutionalism” (Levitsky and Way 2002, D’Anieri 2013, Schedler 2006, and Tushnet 2013).The fundamental question now concerns institutional power prior to election day. With the decline of traditional political parties across the region, many new forces vie for influence over voters. Who exactly controls the electoral process? How has control over voting institutions changed over time? These questions have yet to be addressed in a comprehensive manner, particularly across countries over time. This paper examines variation for a particularly critical component – executive power – over elections since transition to democracy in three Andean countries. It measures every constitutional reform and legal change affecting presidential influence over electoral institutions, and seeks to identify causal factors to explain that variation. Findings reveal why we might witness reforms to institutionalized executive control over institutions and voting procedures. They also raise questions regarding subsequent exercise of presidential power over elections through actions other than constitutional reform and legislation. Both could have implications for why some countries tend to centralize power and veer toward democracy “hybrids,” while others resist concentration of power in a single government branch.

Author

• Katja S Newman, University of California/Irvine