The Watchful Eye & the Cracking Whip: Field Experiments on Corruption Control

• In Event: Controlling Corruption from Within? The Politics of Horizontal Accountability Institutions in Latin America

Abstract

Corruption vulnerabilities exist where government officials have power over the provision of goods and the imposition of costs. Building permits and infrastructure contracts are examples of state-issued goods. Traffic tickets and tax liabilities are examples of costs levied by the state. These and other corruption vulnerabilities turn to actual threats when officials calculate that the benefits of abusing their power are greater than the penalties associated with getting caught. By a similar logic, the formula for corruption control requires increasing the probability of detecting corruption through enhanced monitoring, and then applying the appropriate penalty in response to wrongdoing. However, the common policy response to corruption often emphasizes only the first of the two mechanisms. Governments prioritize transparency measures, but avoid the risks associated with confronting corruption. Therefore, as a means to improve on the current state of affairs, this book examines distinct approaches to promoting accountability. It analyzes the implementation of Mexico’s Freedom of Information Act and summarizes the results of three field experiments on corruption control conducted in the City of Queretaro in Central Mexico, urban and peri-urban districts in Peru, and New York City. The book offers evidence-based recommendations on what works in the fight against corruption.

Author

• Paul F Lagunes, Columbia University