Can providing information to politicians reduce hiring irregularities and increase bureaucratic effectiveness? A field experiment on within-government accountability in Brazil

• In Event: Controlling Corruption from Within? The Politics of Horizontal Accountability Institutions in Latin America

Abstract

Does the provision of information about local bureaucracies to the politicians who oversee them decrease irregularities and improve bureaucratic effectiveness? Information interventions are appealing because of their solid microeconomic foundations, and their relatively low costs. However, recent experimental studies of information campaigns aimed at fostering vertical accountability (between voters and politicians) have found mixed results. Providing information to politicians directly could be more powerful, given politicians' direct responsibility for hiring, firing, and overseeing bureaucrats. Information may be particularly effective when provided by auditing institutions, given politicians' susceptibility to sanctions by these horizontal accountability actors. In this study, I partner with the audit court of one Brazilian state to experimentally study the effects of informing local politicians (both in government and in the opposition) about irregularities and performance in the bureaucracies they oversee. Outcomes will be measured using administrative monthly payroll data, administrative school and clinic results data, and original surveys of bureaucrats (managers of municipals schools, clinics, and social assistance centers) and politicians (municipal secretaries and city councilors). A pre-analysis plan is being pre-registered before the intervention starts in November. Surveys will be fielded between November and January. Administrative data will be collected in the first few months of 2019. The results are expected to contribute to both academic and policy debates about the dynamics of within-government accountability.

Author

• Guillermo Toral, Massachusetts Institute of Technology