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Virtual Exhibit Hall
Session Submission Type: Panel
Horizontal accountability institutions (audit courts, prosecutors, comptroller offices, government transparency initiatives, etc.) are increasingly coming to the fore across the world, and in particular in Latin America, as critical political institutions. Yet the evidence about the politics around these institutions for within-government accountability is relatively thin. How effective are they in controlling corruption? How do issues of capacity, autonomy, and information shape the strategies and impact of these actors? What are the costs and benefits of empowering these institutions for controlling corruption and malfeasance in Latin America? The three papers in this panel present evidence from across the continent on a number of horizontal or within-government accountability strategies for controlling corruption, leveraging experimental and non-experimental methods. In doing so, the panel proposes a discussion not only about particular instances of success and failure, but also a broader debate about the promises and perils of horizontal accountability in the region.
The Watchful Eye & the Cracking Whip: Field Experiments on Corruption Control - Paul F Lagunes, Columbia University
Who is more likely to jeopardise their career? Identifying conditions for being sanctioned for corruption in the Brazilian federal civil service - Fernanda Odilla, King's College London
Can providing information to politicians reduce hiring irregularities and increase bureaucratic effectiveness? A field experiment on within-government accountability in Brazil - Guillermo Toral, Massachusetts Institute of Technology