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Virtual Exhibit Hall
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Session Submission Type: Complete Panel
Can providing information to politicians reduce hiring irregularities and increase bureaucratic effectiveness? A field experiment on within-government accountability - Guillermo Toral, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The Watchful Eye & the Cracking Whip: Field Experiments on Corruption Control - Paul Lagunes, Columbia University in the City of New York
Improving Public Works Distribution and Procurement in the Philippines - Eitan Paul, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor; Nico Ravanilla, University of California-San Diego; Ron Mendoza, Ateneo de Manila University; Allen Hicken, University of Michigan
Mechanisms of Censorship: A Study of Confucius Institute Teachers - Yingjie Fan, Stanford University; Jennifer Pan, Stanford University; Tongtong Zhang, Stanford University
In and Out Bürger: A field experiment testing behavioural interventions to increase engagement of bureaucrats with information from and about citizens - Annabelle Wittels, UCL
Seeking the Personal Vote: How legislators exploit the party mandate - Florian Foos, King's College London; Kyriaki Nanou, University of Nottingham; Daniel Bischof, University of Zurich; Nick Vivyan, Durham University; Sarah Cohen, Northumbria University; Neil Visalvanich, Durham University; Gidon Cohen, Durham University; Patrick Michael Kuhn, Princeton University
Christian R. Grose, University of Southern California
Claudia N. Avellaneda, Indiana University-Bloomington