Moral Luck in Civil War: Aristotle’s Theory of Faction in Politics V

• In Event: Contemporary Applications of Ancient Thought

Abstract

This paper argues for a new reading of Aristotle’s theory of faction (στάσις) in Politics V.1-4, demonstrating that faction originates from an imbalance of goods distributed by luck (εὐτύχημα), making civil war contingent on fortune. In a well-known passage, Aristotle identifies the cause of faction as disagreements over proportionate equality (1301b25-40). Faction arises because oligarchs believe that property warrants inequality with the masses, coming to clashes with democrats who believe that freedom warrants equality with the oligarchs. I show that these ideological tensions can be traced to differences in good birth, strength, beauty, and honour, or the goods that Aristotle attributes to fortuitous circumstances (1295b15-20). The risk of faction emerges from contingencies in practicing human virtue that silo citizens in divergent experiences of political life. Building on studies of these passages by Hatzistavrou (2013) and Kraut (2002), I connect Aristotle’s theory of faction to his ethical treatises. I emphasize virtue as a mean in regulating factional impulses, and the need for a strong middle class. The middle (οῖ μέσοι) regulates the proportionate distribution of fortuitous goods, maintaining eudaimonia in the city and keeping faction at bay. To substantiate my account of contingency, I draw on Martha Nussbaum’s Aristotelian account of moral luck, or what happens to an agent outside her agency. Moral luck plays a role in how the citizens experience life in the polity, giving rise to factional contests over divergent meanings of equality, and making civil strife contingent on the vicissitudes of fortune.

Author

• Theodore Lai Wenming, Georgetown University