How the Opposition Failed Democracy in Turkey: Opposition Coordination in an Electoral Authoritarian Regime

• In Event: Understanding Authoritarianism - I

Abstract

Electoral authoritarian (EA) regimes are challenging contexts for oppositional actors. The uneven playing ground in such regimes makes electorally dislocating incumbents more difficult than in democracies. This is especially true for EA regimes, like in Turkey, where the autocratization occurred in the hands of a leadership that has won successive elections. The existing literature on oppositional electoral performance in EA regimes emphasizes the significance of oppositional coordination and the necessity of forming large cross-cutting electoral alliances. In this paper, studying different oppositional electoral coordination systems in recent Turkish elections, I argue that the architecture of the opposition alliance is also a determinant in oppositional electoral success against incumbents, and the prospects of democratization by elections in EA regimes. The architecture of the electoral coordination between opposition parties in Turkey transformed from the competitive-cooperative model in the 2018 elections to the imposed harmony model in the 2023 elections. This imposed harmony model of the 2023 elections, not only mismanaged the underlying social divisions that affect voting behavior in Turkey but also disregarded the conflictual nature of politics. Consequentially, it was a contributing factor in the failure of the opposition and the EA regime's survival in an electoral cycle where the economic and political conditions were the most favorable for the opposition in recent history.

Author

• Yunus Sozen, Le Moyne College