Party Types and Judicial Independence: Revisiting a Formal Model

• In Event: Judges and Courts as Governing Institutions

Abstract

Do some parties pose a greater threat to judicial independence than others under the same circumstances? Political insurance theories argue that when an incumbent politician expects to lose office, he will tolerate an independent court as a means of protecting his future self. By this account, the expectation of government turnover due to political competition offers incentive for incumbents to support independent courts out of self-interest, thus sustaining judicial independence. Yet not all cases follow this pattern: in select instances, incumbents oppose independent courts despite high political competition. To explain these deviant cases, I revisit Stephenson’s formal model and highlight two party-level characteristics that are often overlooked in empirical studies of judicial independence. Through original comparative statics, I show that incumbent parties that are less forward-thinking (δ) or possess a high tolerance for risk (α) operate based on meaningfully different payoff functions which make sustaining independent courts more demanding for the entire political system, even under ideal system-level conditions for independence. This analysis suggests that certain parties do pose a greater threat to judicial independence than others and supports a party-centric approach to studying judicial independence. By highlighting party-level factors, I extend Stephenson’s original model and incorporate additional complexity.

Author

• Alice Cho Timken, Syracuse University