Aristotle's Critique of a Universal Good

• In Event: Political Philosophy and How One Ought to Live

Abstract

In Plato's Republic, Socrates suggests that the rulers of the best city will need to possess knowledge of the Idea of the Good, which is higher even than justice. For we do everything for the sake of the Good, as something we sense or divine, but we are unable to get a sufficient grasp of what it is, or have a stable trust as we have of other things (505d-e). Plato's student Aristotle begins his Nicomachean Ethics by pointing to what seems to be a similar thought: he inquires into the ultimate good or goods for the sake of which we do everything, which he suggests that we aim at like archers shooting arrows without a target in view (1094a1-3, 18-25). But instead of proposing to lead his reader toward the knowledge of the Good that is the highest object of Plato's philosopher-kings' education, Aristotle limits his focus to the "human good" or highest good attainable by action, which we call happiness. In the course of doing so, Aristotle injects a surprisingly long and technical critique of the universal Good into his discussion of happiness in Book I. In this paper I explore why he introduces this discussion where he does, and, especially, explore the perplexities about the universal Good that Aristotle brings to light in his discussion of it. In doing so, I hope to get clearer about that unclear Good for which Plato suggests that we do all that we do.

Author

• Kathryn E Hansen, MIT