Punishing in the Future Present Tense: Chiliasm and Moral Responsibility in Kant

• In Event: Ethics, Trust, Forgiveness, and Punishment

Abstract

Kantian retributivism aligns with the moral intuition that punishment must be a matter of desert (the answer to an evil deed) and refuses to compromise on this principle. Yet this exclusive concern for moral responsibility binds Kant’s hands. He is committed to punishing violations based on desert et pereat mundus, and at the same time unable to punish at all if intentions cannot be assessed. Kant is altogether unwilling to force moral behavior by law (violations of “ethical law” can’t be sanctioned because we cannot coerce the ‘right reasons’ behind behavior), but keen to constrain outward behavior that infringes on others (“juridical law” does not treat of motives but does prohibit the violation of others). In other words, the law may punish the simple fact that a criminal used someone as a means to an end, but this is a far cry from righteous retribution.

Especially in his “Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View” Kant betrays a certain forward-looking tendency, an admission that a world governed by the categorical imperative cannot be realized but through a process, an evolution, which itself depends on unethical human behavior (conflict and violence). Accordingly, his reflections on punishment are somewhat inconsistent and contradictory. For Kant, the only unconditional good is the morally good will, duty performed for its own sake – retribution is such a moral duty – yet on his own theory, such a will is contingent on perfect freedom. While politics is subordinate to morality in importance, it is chronologically prior. The state has a duty to protect civil order. The human condition must evolve toward that state of freedom that permits pure free will, and any such progress demands first the avoidance of regress to the state of nature; this opens to door to instrumental considerations in punishment, namely deterrence. In short, I make the case that while Kant’s liberal theory of punishment is extremely righteous ‘on paper’, considerations of political reality temper it beyond recognition. His prescriptions become muddied with consequentialist concerns, as well as empathy for the arbitrariness of the human condition.

Author

• Gabe Eve Whitbread, Duke University