Budget Politics and Partisan Stereotypes: Deficit Spending and Negative Agenda-Setting

• In Event: The US Presidency and Executive Power II

Abstract

According to popular partisan stereotypes, the Democratic Party is committed to spending on social programs and the Republican Party is committed to balancing the federal budget. But what if these stereotypes do not accurately describe the governing reality? This study surveys the last 35 years of national budget politics in the U.S. and critically examines the conditions under which annual budget deficits increase, decrease, or remain constant. Specifically, the national government is examined under four conditions: unified Democratic control, unified Republican control, divided government with a Democratic President, and divided government with a Republican President. The expectation is that neither party decreases deficit spending under unified control because (a) presidential politics are defined by an ambitious (and expensive) policy agenda and (b) members of Congress are supportive of the policy agendas of Presidents of the same party. A second expectation is that divided government with a Democratic President will stabilize or decrease annual deficits because (a) congressional Republicans feel empowered to limit spending in a manner consistent with their political ideology and brand (b) while simultaneously limiting the policy success of a President from the opposing party. In essence, this study examines the extent to which partisan stereotypes surrounding budget politics fail to capture the incentive structure of political parties and inter-branch dynamics.

Author

• A.K. Shauku, Buffalo State University (SUNY)