The Progressive Origins of Presidentialism in Bureaucratic Oversight

• In Event: The US Presidency and Executive Power I

Abstract

In this paper I show that historical attempts to frame and address the problem of bureaucracy have all relied on an overly formalistic conception of the separation of powers originating in the progressive era. Consequently, I argue that the institutionalization of a progressive understanding of the separation of powers through the New Deal served as a critical juncture in the development of bureaucratic politics. In particular, it emphasized the necessity of exclusive presidential control over the federal bureaucracy as a means of overcoming the stultifying effects of the Constitution's separation of powers. This, in turn, created a situation of path dependence, forcing all subsequent attempts to address the bureaucracy problem to center around the presidency. I contend that the necessary first step to addressing the ongoing problem of bureaucracy in the United States is to depart from the path created by the progressive understanding of the separation of powers. To accomplish this, I suggest the need to recover the "separation of functions" approach to the Constitution, which will point toward the need for multi-branch oversight of the bureaucracy.

Author

• Joseph Karol Natali, Baylor University