Still Agreeing to Disagree? Toward a Theory of Constructive Ambiguity

• In Event: Re-Theorizing International Relations

Abstract

Constructive ambiguity (CA) involves the intentional use of vague language to facilitate compromise. While existing literature explores the role of CA in facilitating co-operation across different bargaining contexts, this work suffers from conceptual and methodological limitations which I address in this paper. Conceptually, extant research has not adequately delimited CA from other uses of ambiguity. Much work understands CA as the use of vague language to paper over intractable disputes. Importantly, this is functionally distinct from the use of ambiguity to enhance co-operation where actors’ win-sets coincide. Where agreement exists, vague language may be beneficial as, owing to the prohibitive transaction costs of continued negotiation, it affords actors flexibility in complying with their obligations. However, the literature on CA often equivocates between these distinct cases, claiming that CA is employed even where win-sets already converge. Moreover, there has been no attempt to clarify how CA relates to the unintentional legal ambiguity arising from ‘regime complexity’, or the strategic use of ambiguity to deter, rather than co-operate with, actors. Indeed, much research views any sign of imprecision as evidence of CA, without clarifying which co-operation problem this ambiguity is addressing or whether this ambiguity is intentional. Here, I argue that CA’s defining feature is the intentional use of ambiguous language to facilitate agreement in the absence of overlapping win-sets. The goal of this paper is to defend and distinguish this definition from other uses of imprecise language to reduce measurement error in studying CA’s effectiveness.

Author

• Robert Patrick Whelan, Syracuse University