Democratic Locke

• In Event: Democracy, Morality, and Norms

Abstract

Scholars continue to debate how “democratic” Locke is, and this question usually hinges on arguments about how broadly he would advocate expanding the franchise or arguments about the relative priority of non-interference and democratic institutions. I frame the question differently, starting from the ancient distinction between a democracy and a polity. In a polity, the many are entitled to rule because the virtues necessary for rule are widely shared among citizens. In a democracy, on the other hand, the many are entitled to rule simply because they are free, regardless of whether they have the virtues of exercising that freedom well.

Locke argues for limited government, in which citizens retain the right to judge the legitimacy of political power, because he believes all citizens share the capacity for rational self-rule. Most interpretations implicitly assume he is describing a polity, one in which the government is founded on a belief people can be trusted to exercise rational choice well, or at least well enough. I argue that he is instead deliberately describing a democracy, one in which government is founded on our bare capacity for choice, despite a deeply pessimistic expectation that we will often choose badly. Careful attention to how Locke constructs the argument of the _Second Treatise_ shows that Lockean government depends only on our capacity for reason, not our use of it. This reading thus reveals the truly radical character of Locke’s work.

Author

• Michelle Brady, Xavier University