The Political Economy of Autocratic Transitions: The Role of Delegation of Violence

• In Event: Front and Center: Violence in Politics

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a political economy model of institutional change leading to a transition from democracy to autocracy. A powerful political center lacks commitment to repress surges of instability which threaten the economic elites it represents. A process of institutional delegation of political power to a violent group allows the center to gain the commitment it lacks and to re-establish political stability. The limited forward-looking capacity of the democratic political system, however, induces excessive delegation of power, leading the violent group to establish an autocratic government. The institutional mechanism leading to autocracy delineated in the paper fits well the rise to power of Fascism in Italy after World War I - from 1919 to 1925 - but the main political economy component of the mechanism we identify are common to several historical transition phenomena.

Authors

• Fabio Enrico Traverso, GSEFM, TU darmstadt, PSE

• Alberto Bisin, NYU, NBER, CEPR

• Thierry Verdier, PSE, CEPR, PUC Rio