From Tokens to Tipping Points: Credibility, Concessions, and the Birth of Ethnic Parties

• In Event: Global Shifts in Party Politics and Power

Abstract

Why do minority elites sometimes found ethnic parties yet at other times remain inside majority coalitions—or stay out of electoral politics altogether? I model the choice as a sequential game between ruling coalitions and minority elites, then extend it to a repeated Bayesian‑persuasion setting in which governments send noisy “inclusion” signals over time. In the one‑shot baseline, a simple participation threshold links ethnic‑party entry to two observable factors: (i) the cost borne by ruling parties when offering policy or office concessions, and (ii) the competitiveness of elections, which determines elites’ outside option. The threshold produces an inverted‑U: token concessions suppress entry at low levels, but once credibility erodes further gestures accelerate mobilisation. The dynamic extension shows how repeated low‑cost gestures and adverse shocks (e.g., violence, revoked quotas) create belief cascades that precipitate sudden party formation.

Author

• Wali Reheman, American University